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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores various forms of what will be termed cross-disciplinarity (C-D) and the 
intellectual consequences of the adoption of C-D methods for social scientific analysis (though the 
moves towards the adoption of C-D methods are not confined just to the social sciences and 
humanities). C-D is used as a generic category to express a range of what are often labelled 
interdisciplinary approaches to analytical problems. But for reasons which should become clear 
later I reserve the term ‘inter-disciplinarity’ for a particular mode of analytical thought that 
challenges the ubiquity and solidity of traditional disciplinarity as usually understood. Thus the 
paper explores all those ways that intellectual disciplinary structures have come into critical focus, 
and the terminologies that are deployed to express the challenges to the homogeneity of the 
disciplines. It is suggested that we live in a world where C-D is increasingly celebrated, and part of 
the paper investigates the possible reasons for the rise of this intellectual trend and style of 
analysis, and its consequences. 
 
For the most part the paper is suggestive and exploratory. Since there are many terms in play in 
these discussions a preliminary focus of the paper is on providing some intellectual clarity in 
respect to the terminological abundance that typifies this area. This involves drawing careful 
distinctions between various forms of C-D. Unless we are sure of precisely what we are talking 
about – in terms of both the idea of the disciplines and of C-D – further elaboration of 
consequences may prove unhelpful. But at this stage the claim is no more than to provide a 
preliminary specification of these formulations. This is a complex area where positions still remain 
fluid enough to warrant a note of caution in trying to tie everything down prematurely. 
 
And this note of caution is particularly appropriate for the discussion of the possible reasons for the 
emergence of a strong cross-disciplinary complex, and its consequences and implications. Here 
the paper becomes even more speculative. In asking what the consequences of this C-D mood 
might be, the paper concentrates upon the issue of its implications for the difference between 
theory and methodology, and particularly for what it says about the status of theory. What does 
‘doing theory’ mean in an overtly C-D context? As will be seen, this is not an easy question to 
answer. But in responding to it the paper raises several issues about another strong contemporary 
intellectual trend; that associated with the notion of ‘performativity’. Here the claim is that theory is 
increasingly being recast in terms of its performativity, and the paper tries to demarcate various 
senses of performativity operating in the context of theoretical endeavours undertaken in a C-D 
framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
2. The Disciplines and Disciplinarity 
 
 Let us begin with the disciplines. There are several aspects of disciplines that are thought to typify 
them and provide them with their intellectual strength. These aspects are central to the popular 
beliefs about the disciplines. And they provide a framework for the defence of the integrity of 
disciplines against attempts to loosen the grip on disciplinary activity with the advance of several 
forms of what is called ‘cross-disciplinarity’, which are discussed in a moment. 
 
The first characteristic argued to typify traditional disciplines is that they display a certain unity: a 
unity in their problematics, in their categories, and in their techniques of investigation. This unity 
provides the disciplines with a coherent intellectual field or purpose, associated with a singular and 
homogeneous ‘object’ of investigation: the biological world, the economy, medical conditions, etc. 
 
The second characteristic aspect of disciplines is a certain rigour in respect to their procedures and 
methods of investigation. Such a rigorous discipline ensures against the perils of sloppy thinking, 
against the dilution of their approaches which threatens to undermine the forcefulness, authenticity 
and authority of their analytical results and truth claims. 
 
The third aspect is a certain autonomy in their modes of existence. This autonomy has two basic 
features. They are autonomous from each other, and they are autonomous from the powers or 
authorities that might wish to appropriate them. There is all manner of institutionalization of the 
disciplines designed to ensure against possible encroachments on their separated territorial 
identities: professionalization, specialist organizations of support and dissemination, academic 
departmentalization, publishing outlets, etc. 
 
What these three basic characteristic aspects do is to enable the disciplines to maintain their 
independence, from one another and from those who might wish to control them. They support the 
self-confidence of the disciplines, providing them with a seeming strength, authority and singularity 
of purpose. They enable ‘boundary maintenance’ (Abbot 2001), which is such an important part of 
the ‘disciplinary complex’. The disciplines fiercely defend their particular intellectual and 
organizational ‘patch’. 
 
If this represents in outline the popular beliefs about the disciplines --which is not to say that it is 
only held by those who actually know little about disciplinarity since it also represents the self-belief 
of those who are intimately involved with the disciplines and their defence -- what are we to make 
of these ‘defensive’ claims? The argument made here is to suggest that the disciplines display few 
if any of these features in their actual day to day practices: they are not unified, they are not 
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rigorous, and nor are they autonomous in the senses outlined above. In fact the disciplines are 
always already compromised, they are always subject to cross-fertilizations, and they are riddled 
with disputes. 
 
Take the discipline of geography as an example. Is this unified? Hardly. It is riddled with disputes, 
for instance between ‘physical geography’ and various forms of ‘cultural geography’. Similarly with 
psychology: here one of the main lines of fracture is between ‘behavioural’ and ‘social’ 
psychologists. These hardly speak to one another. But I would suggest that these are not isolated 
instances, and that such disputes – which involve issues associated with all three of the central 
aspects of disciplinarity outlined above – are an enduring feature of all the disciplines, at least to 
some extent. Obviously some display more of the characteristics of unity, rigour and autonomy 
than others, but few are completely exempt from some compromise and accommodation in respect 
to these. 
 
3. What is Cross-Disciplinarity? 
 
We now move on to those aspects of disciplinarity that consciously challenge the defensive self-
representation of the homogeneity of disciplines (D) as just outlined. Here we discuss the following 
concepts: pre-disciplinarity (P-D), multi-disciplinarity (M-D), inter-disciplinarity (I-D), trans-
disciplinarity (T-D), and, finally, post-disciplinarity (Pst-D).  With the exception of a possible 
additional category discussed at the end of this section (‘ill-disciplinarity’ – Il-D) this more or less 
exhausts the terminology at stake in these debates. 
 
Pre-disciplinarity is a necessary concept to account for both the period before the traditional 
disciplines were founded, and as a category to illustrate the formation of ‘new’ disciplinary 
structures in the contemporary era. In large part the traditional disciplines were forged from  
disparate sets of practical knowledges, processes and methods, and dispersed cognitive and 
intellectual developments (see the discussion below on the construction of the ‘persona’ of the 
theorist). Some suggest these processes began as a result of the Renaissance, others only with 
the reform of the ancient -- and formation of the modern -- universities in the 19th Century (Fuller 
2004). Taking ‘astronomy’ as an example, this combined optics and crucially its instruments, with 
early mathematics and physics. A more contemporary example is ‘cultural studies’ which involves 
the forging together of elements drawn from literary theory, sociology and anthropology. 
 
If we skip traditional disciplinarity (D) as outlined above, the next category to consider is multi-
disciplinarity. M-D is basically a process that brings together several separate disciplines to 
address a single object from their different perspectives. Thus this involves an accumulation of 
disciplinary perspectives focussing on the same object. An example would be ‘urban studies’, 
where this can be illuminated with the aid of sociology, economics, geography, municipal 
engineering, planning, etc. Thus M-D does not ‘disturb’ the disciplines as such but asks them to 
address the same issue from their different and already constituted intellectual stances, with the 
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anticipation that this will provide a richer analysis, adding insights that could not be generated from 
the application of just a single discipline. 
 
The next category to consider is inter-disciplinarity. For the purposes of this paper I-D describes an 
‘aggregation’ process of disciplinary perspectives. It relates to the way the disciplines are 
combined under an investigatory stance with respect to an issue, with the intention of producing a 
‘synthesis’ between them. Thus whilst the integrity of the disciplines are still essentially ‘preserved’ 
in this process, it also seeks to synthesis their respective approaches; to add insights through a 
process of their re-assembly and re-configuration. 
 
A further step along the process of disruption of the traditional effectivity of disciplinary activity – 
one that further questions their singular integrity -- is provided by trans-disciplinary approaches 
(Futures, 2003). The distinctive features of T-D approaches are that they overtly seek to 
‘transcend’ or ‘transform’ the existing disciplinary structures and their descriptions. The objective is 
to produce new structures of intelligibility, new orders of knowledge, new techniques of 
intervention, and new forms of subjectivity. Above all, this is seen as an ‘inventive’ process: its 
outcomes are innovative and deliberately re-constructive. 
 
This is somewhat in contrast to the idea of post-disciplinarity. Pst-D is deliberately ‘de-
constructive’; it trades on the idea that there can no longer be any form of stable disciplinary based 
discourse or boundaries (Turner 2006). These have been destroyed by several features of the 
post-modern world (so here ‘post-modernity’ -- essentially a discursive category, and the ‘post-
modern condition’ – seen as objective features of the modern world through which we live our 
lives, tend to be rather run together). Globalization theory, post-colonial studies, networked-
knowledge, complexity theory and the like are seen as the modalities of this move into a Pst-D 
world (Spivak 2003)..  Knowledges are necessarily fragmented, continually in play, fluid, always 
threatening to overspill or overwhelm meaning and sense.  
 
Attitudes towards such a concept of Pst-D are likely to vary depending upon attitudes towards the 
idea of post-modernity itself. For reasons that cannot be fully discussed here, I do not find this an 
altogether attractive analytical category. But I suspect it will gather much added momentum in the 
future. I would liken it to a category mentioned above, that is ‘ill-disciplinarity’ (Il-D). With this 
category intellectual reason breaks down, any discipline dissipates, disruptive intellectual anarchy 
rules. This is not quite the same as Pst-D, of course – which maintains some pretence at reason 
and intellectual rigor. But it is basically the idea of a programmatic and epochal condition 
associated with Pst-D that is rejected here, ie., ‘post-modernity’ seen as a totally new configurative 
social order (see also below). Thus for the most part, and other than in the case of disciplinarity 
seen as a base category, I am interested in M-D, I-D and T-D, which following Barry et.al. (2008), I 
would term various forms of cross-disciplinarity (C-D). 
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So how do we relate this series of categories to each other? What is the relationship between all 
these forms of intellectual activity? One way of representing this is illustrated by Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The Disciplinary Cycle 
D
M-D
I-D
P-D
T-D
Pst-
D/IL
-D
 
 
In this case, the representation implies an evolutionary cycle: beginning with a P-D phase, we 
move to a disciplinary one (D), then on to various forms of C-D that disrupt this phase (M-D, I-D, T-
D). At the T-D stage there is a possible ‘side-track’ to an ill-disciplinary stage (Il-D). This is put in 
the figure to pose the question as to whether T-D in fact implies Il-D? Alternatively, these two 
phases could be characterised by a Pst-D stage. In the first case, however, there remains the 
possibility of a renewal of the cycle to link to a new P-D phase, and the whole process begins 
again. But in the second case this looks to be impossible since Pst-D implies no ‘return’ to the 
routine of disciplinization: it is a kind of terminal disruption of that process. 
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But the illustration in Figure 1 may be too ‘mechanical’ and overly ‘evolutionary’. Another way to 
illustrate the relationship involves seeing the concepts as continually in play rather than one being 
replaced by the other in a sequence. This is illustrated by Figure 2. 
Figure 2: The Disciplinarity Matrix 
 
M-D
I-D
D
IL-D/ 
Pst-D
P-D
T-D
 
 
Thus here we have the possibility of an overlapping range of P-D, D and C-D forms in a complex 
formation where the analytical issue is to deal with the application of several frameworks at the 
same time. Any object of analysis can be confronted from several different disciplinary and C-D 
angles. This provides a richer framework of analysis. 
 
But even this may appear overtly complex. So a third possible way of illustrating the relationships 
involved is shown in Figure 3.1
 
 A clear pathway is represented here, one that probably conforms 
closer to the spirit of the remarks outlined above. 
 
 
                                                          
1 I thank Magali Gravier from CBS for suggesting this diagramatic presentation. 
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Figure 3: The Disciplinarity Complex 
 
 
 
10 
 
4. Why the Current Emphasis on Cross-Disciplinarity? 
 
Whatever one chooses to term the current enthusiasm for non-single disciplinary approaches, 
whether it be interdisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity, or cross-disciplinarity as favoured here, the 
underlying issue is the same. These are promoted and celebrated as offering the only appropriate 
approaches to current problems and concerns, basically because of the perceived ‘complexity’ of 
the modern world. Thus a single disciplinary approach is not considered adequate to analyse or 
describe ‘globalization’ for instance. This is too complex a phenomenon to be captured by one 
single discipline. 
 
And this idea of the complexity of the modern world extends to all the big issues of the day: the 
‘knowledge-based’ society and innovation; environmental sustainability; national and personal 
security; citizenship and identity, etc., etc. None of these is thought to satisfactorily lend itself to a 
single disciplinary approach. And one could extend these examples to many other contemporary 
areas of concern. 
 
Gibbons (1999) suggests this is part of a new ‘reflexive’ contractual settlement between ‘science’ 
and society: “One aspect of this new contract is that it needs to reflect the increasing complexity of 
modern society. For example, there are no longer clear demarcation lines between university 
science and industrial science, between basic research, applied research and product 
development, or even between careers in the academic world and in industry. There is now greater 
movement across institutional boundaries, a blurring of professional identities and greater diversity 
of career patterns” (Gibbons, 1999, p.C81). 
 
But there is a second underlying reason why C-D approaches are favoured over single disciplinary 
ones, which has to do with the desire to engage the public in a dialogue with the traditional 
disciplinary culture and its outputs. The way this is presented, particularly in the UK context, is the 
demand by funding bodies to engage the constituencies or stakeholders in any research 
programme. An enormous amount of effort on the part of researchers goes into meeting this 
requirement for ‘user involvement’, which has become effectively a binding rule and condition for 
funding. Such reflexivity creates its own interesting ‘imagined’ parties in the relationship: the 
imagines lay person (ILP) (Martana, et.al., 2003) and a possible counter in the imagined 
disciplinary expert (IDE) (Strathern 2004). 
 
However, it goes further than this, since in many cases the demand is to draw the public into the 
very process of investigation; they effectively become co-researchers in many ways. What seems 
to be at stake here is the attempt to muddy the boundary between ‘experts’ and ‘lay-opinion’. The 
implication is that there is no longer a clear distinction to be made between those with expertise 
and those without it, i.e. the general public. Thus, to some extent at least, the notion of ‘expertise’ 
is under threat from the adoption of C-D approaches (see below). Indeed, it implies a complex 
relationship between expertise and lay opinion in which, perhaps, that distinction itself is being 
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eroded (Strathern 2004). In the UK context this has to do with a more general political programme 
of ‘social inclusion’ and the ‘democratization’ of areas of social and economic life. All research has 
to be relevant, and a way to ensure this is to include the general public in the process of agenda 
setting and ‘assessing’ that research as it goes along. This is made more amenable by pressing C-
D type approaches since these are not only thought to be more appropriate in dealing with a 
complex world, but also are more easily understood by the lay-public, enabling them to intervene. 
In the light of this Gibbons (1999, C.84) suggests that ‘reliable knowledge’ is being replaced by a 
new category: ‘socially robust knowledge’. 
 
Stephen Turner (2003) provides a thorough analysis of the wider political and cultural issues 
associated with this trend, one which he sees as providing a serious challenge to traditional 
notions of ‘liberal democracy’. How can the growing divide between rule by the people and rule by 
experts be bridged, so that the troubled relationship between expertise and democratic 
accountability in resolved? He suggests several responses organized around a training of the 
‘competent citizen’ (though see below). 
 
But what might be the consequences of this? The difficulty is that it could simple end up promoting 
the idea that anyone’s opinion is as good as anyone else’s. Thus knowledge becomes merely a 
matter of ‘opinion’ without any clear way of discriminating between such opinions. And this could 
equally well provide further justification for ‘popular prejudice’ to become legitimized. One only has 
to look to the USA where the ideas about Darwinism are incendiary in popular debate, and where 
scientists like Richard Dawkins are reduced to shouting at evangelical Christians, and vice versa. 
But these kinds of disputes are accelerating, and this is not unconnected to the way scientific 
research is being recast along lines that undermines the distinction between expertise and lay 
opinion. And this raises an important further connected point. Disputation amongst scientists over 
the validity of research results is increasing and the scepticism amongst the public similarly 
growing. These two are inter-linked. Take ‘global warming’ for instance. Climate scientists cannot 
agree on whether this is happening, or what or who is responsible if it is. There is widespread 
publicly voiced disagreement. Similarly with vaccinations like MMR for rubella. Medical scientists 
disagree on the consequences of this. And there are many other profound disagreements along 
similar lines. What does the public do under these circumstances where science disagrees? The 
decision is thrown on to the public (lay opinion) to makes up its own mind, or chose what to do. 
Science (expertise) cannot solve the issue one way or another. So the public is asked to assess 
what it should do ‘on-its-own’ as it were. It is ‘abandoned’ to its own devices in making a 
judgement. How might it go about this? It must detect partisanship and biases amongst experts. 
Presumably, it does this by assessing the claims and counterclaims of different groups of scientists 
by looking at their credentials: what universities or research institutes are they from 
(prestigious/non-prestigious); what is their status within their professional bodies; who publically 
backs this or that group; reputation and authority; past record, etc. 
 
And this emphasis on bringing the general public closer into the research agenda setting process 
is bolstered by another requirement associated with C-D: the disciplines and research must be 
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made more ‘accountable’, as mentioned above. Thus C-D is also associated with a desire to make 
academic and other disciplinary bound bodies more accountable, to both their constituencies of 
interest and the funding bodies. C-D enhances this process since it is more accessible to funding 
masters, and less tied up with hidebound single discipline constraints. 
 
An added incentive is provided by the kind of student and their interests that are coming into the 
higher education system, and the kinds of demands being made by the labour market as they exit 
that system. Increasingly secondary schools are promoting cross-disciplinary type activity within 
the curriculum and project work. This is partly to foster student interest and as a strategy for social 
inclusion, and to deal with mixed abilities. But when they get to universities, their expectations and 
choices are to build on this with more and more cross-disciplinary type activity. Combined degree 
and vocationally orientated degree programmes have, as a result, proliferated. And employers 
want a compliant and adaptable set of work skills, which emerge more readily from cross-
disciplinary activity. 
 
Finally, it is worth considering whether C-D actually represents a new form of governance, whether 
in a rather paradoxical manner it represents a new way to (re)-discipline the disciplines? This could 
appear paradoxical since, ostensibly at least, C-D seems to undermine the disciplines, to disturb 
their hold on academic and research life. But it may indirectly provide the means to gain more 
access to the disciplines themselves. If the traditional disciplinary structures are seen as one of the 
main obstacles to ‘sensible’ and ‘relevant’ research, one ‘fit for the modern world’, etc., then 
promoting C-D - in part at least - would provide an avenue to gain added indirect leverage on these 
disciplines by by-passing them, as it were, or pressing them into the service of C-D. 
 
Thus – to take this one step further – C-D might be a new form of governance associated with the 
neo-liberal agenda. The neo-liberal agenda increasingly subjects all activity to the test of the 
market, and academic research is no longer completely exempt from this. Market testing and 
market discipline, competition over funding, etc., is the language increasingly deployed in the 
academic research environment. C-D could be the path to further this objective. But neo-liberalism 
also stresses the ‘responsibilization’ and ‘autonomization’ of agents and agencies. In this respect, it 
promotes indirect ‘governance at a distance’ by shaping the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Thompson 
2008). But this may not be in contradiction with C-D approaches. In as much that the users are 
newly empowered to have the right to know what is going on in research projects, this has to be 
made visible to them through the institutional responsibility for a (visible) self-management of such 
a responsible institutions’ (Strathern 2004). This double reflexive action of ‘responsibility’ in the 
mechanism through which such governance-at-a-distance in this area is secured. 
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5. On Theory and ‘The New Performativity’ 
 
This section sets out to explore another facet associated with the advent of C-D inflected research 
agendas: what it says about the nature of theory and methodology. I will argue that this is 
intimately connected to a re-casting – at least in part – of what is understood by theory, and in the 
relationship between theory and methodology. But this recasting has itself a much wider 
resonance, the various implications of which are explored elsewhere, if in a preliminary manner 
(Thompson 2008). The task of this section is to connect this wider canvass to the rather more 
limited and specific concerns of this paper, notably its implications with respect to C-D. That will be 
done later in the section, but there is a necessity to preface this with some general discussion of 
what may be happening to the traditional conception of ‘theory’ in contemporary intellectual life, 
which I will argue is being undermined by the advent of C-D type approaches. And to be clear at 
this stage, my argument is that not all of this is undesirable or to be condemned out of hand. 
Indeed, in large part, one particular manner in which this recasting is being undertaken is to be 
thoroughly supported and celebrated. More of this later. 
 
The main point is to suggest that theory is being recast by being associated with various forms of 
‘performativity’, some of which are positive, others quite negative in their implications1
 
. The 
traditional and conventional view of theory is that it is a prelude to -- or an accompaniment of -- an 
investigation: theory and investigation are closely linked and theory has a strong investigatory 
moment attached to it. But the argument here is that increasingly theory is being divorced from an 
investigation – or perhaps better put – is being re-cast in this relationship – by being considered as 
a performance: theory is above all else a performance. It is enacted by and through a particular 
type of persona: ‘the theorist’ (more about this category later). And such theorists speak a 
particular kind of analytical language, one mainly directed at other theorists. This comprises an 
almost hermetically sealed discursive enactment directed towards other theorists, access to which 
is made almost deliberately difficult for those not familiar with its tropes and nuances, the non-
cognoscenti.  
What is more this is connected to the idea of the theorist as ‘celebrity’. Theorists can become the 
new celebrities who’s credibility rests upon them performing to their audiences. In addition, of 
course, there is the other type of celebrity – the ‘artistic celebrity’ – who gains a voice in debates 
about public policy and agenda setting, often operating on the international stage (see Cooper 
2007). Many of these ‘lay-person agenda setters’ have no necessary expertise, yet they are the 
ones that both claim a voice and attract an audience. The question this poses is whether truth itself 
is also becoming performative rather than substantive or constitutive? (Note that true celebrity can 
be nothing more that the ‘performance of the self’: celebrities need no necessary competencies 
other that the ability to perform or enact themselves, they ‘display’ themselves as themselves and 
are celebrated for it). 
                                                          
1 For a fascinating exchange dealing with these  matters (and many more besides) see Ian Hunter (2006); Frederick 
Jameson’s (2008) rather ill-tempered retort, and Hunter’s (2008) more measured reply, and also Thompson 2006 for a 
discussion of different forms of performance – and as a precursor to all of this, Thompson 1985. 
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Of course we are all subject to this process of performativity. We are constantly subject to the 
strictures of performance: calculated about, energised by, monitored through, quality assessed by, 
audited in respect of, and rewarded in the name of, our performance (see Munro 1999). ‘Worth’ is 
increasingly dependent upon performance outputs. And here is where expertise can re-enter the 
picture because this can be recognised as worthy when it leads to clear and immediate results, 
ones that can be readily understood by the lay public. Thus there can be a clear link between 
expertise and performance where this is able to be demonstrated via understandable outcomes. 
But with a good deal of intellectual activity, this link is more obscure, unclear and not immediately 
apparent. Nevertheless, this should not necessarily mean it is undervalued as a result, but it tends 
to be so in an environment where it is performativity that provides the criterion for worthiness. 
Hence in an environment in which performativity (and C-D) abounds, it will be those projects and 
research issues that promise the most obvious link to clearly defined and immediate outcomes, 
things that can be easily assessed, that will attract the funding. Traditional theoretical reflection is 
clearly disadvantaged by this, since it often cannot show clear performative outcomes that can be 
calculated about, nor do these necessarily arise quickly or transparently. Perhaps this is why, as a 
result, it may be increasingly only ‘performed’ to other theorists? 
 
Clearly, there are several different types of performance. Some are successful, other not: good and 
bad performances abound. And performance can be deliberately varied in respect to different 
audiences (see Thompson 1985). 
 
What about the relationship between this notion of performance and methodology? Or another way 
to put this is to ask about the relationship between theory and methodology within this new C-D 
environment? The questions here are as follows: Is methodology replacing theory? As theory 
retreats into performance, is it methodology that takes centre stage? Is the ‘investigative moment’ 
mentioned above now only confined or associated with methodology? Clearly methodology has 
risen up the status league in academic research and funding -- if nothing else because the funding 
masters demand it. But in my experience it is under the umbrella of ‘methodology’ that more and 
more ‘theory’ is taught at the undergraduate and post-graduate level in universities. And because 
methodology has become such an important part of funding applications, it has risen up the 
academic agenda anyway. We live in a new and interesting era of ‘methodological innovation’ as a 
result. However, methodology then becomes a surrogate for theory – so ‘methods’ and 
‘investigations’ can avoid an explicit theoretical moment if it is methodology that stands in the place 
of theory in this relationship, while ‘theory’ becomes confined to a celebratory performance for the 
cognoscenti only. 
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6 Is there a Positive side to ‘Performativity’?  
 
Up until now the discussion of performativity and its relationship to theory has been rather 
negatively and critically inflected. But as suggested earlier, this is not all doom and gloom. I would 
argue that there is a definite upside to the notion of performativity in relationship to theory, and this 
is explored in this section of the paper. The discussion will initially take the form of a further 
reflection as to what theory is and provide a suggestive – though perhaps rather unfamiliar and 
controversial -- characterization of it. In this context the positive aspect to performance will be 
elaborated 
 
Obviously theory is subject to several different modalities, some of which are outlined in passing as 
this discussion develops below. One way to begin is by thinking again in terms of the ‘persona’ of 
the theorist (Gaukroger 2006, Hunter 2007). What type of personhood can do or perform theory? 
How is such ‘theorist as persona’ constructed? 
 
Supposing we were to think of the theorist as a consequential figure in the ‘art of reasoning’. What 
might be meant by the art of reasoning? This is the key question: the art of reasoning (note: 
reasoning here has nothing necessarily to do with a ‘rational being’, indeed it is precisely 
counterpoised to this figure). Paraphrasing Hunter (2007) I suggest that this term -- the ‘arts of 
reasoning’ -- comprises a loose configurative ensemble of logico-rhetorical methods, cognitive 
techniques, doctrines, modes of proof, techniques and ethical exercises, etc., that constitutes a 
certain type of personhood that can represent to itself  a unity of purposes and ‘ideas’. Thus the art 
of reasoning is an ethico-technical cognitive ensemble of these features, involving the ‘practical 
mastery’ of these techniques. From this perspective this is what ‘theory’ comprises. 
 
What is this conception -- the arts of reasoning -- pitched against? Several terms come to mind: 
paradigm, problematic, Weltanschauung (as in a ‘scheme of belief’), and discourse. These are the 
classic and very current modalities of theoretical exploration. But they are too ‘philosophically over-
determined’ to past-muster for the kind of analysis being suggested here (see Hunter 2006, 2007, 
2009). Indeed, it is precisely to draw attention away from such a mega- or master-philosophically 
driven understanding and underpinning of theory that this conceptual apparatus seeks to 
elaborate. 
 
This conception also needs to be seen in distinction to a form of theorizing that insists on the idea 
of ‘context-dependency’: that to understand any theoretical truth claim requires us to situate it in an 
(often historically specific) context. Understanding and sense making then become a matter of the 
reduction of claims to a ‘neutral’ context, seen as a unity of conditions that provides general 
historical frameworks for understanding the specifics of truth claims – a context that is faced by 
everyone and by everything in a particular time frame. Such a ‘context dependency’ invokes a 
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quasi-transcendental structure of ‘conditions of possibility’ facing the intellectual community at 
large, and with which it must of necessity engage and negotiate to mine or generate the truth 
claims of theory. 
 
This conception also speaks against the idea of Kuhnian paradigms – understood as mutually 
interlocking systems of presuppositions, concepts, and theory laden observations giving rise to 
internal objects of knowledge. Such internal objects of knowledge (the paradigms) are then seen 
as incompatible and incommensurable – one is simply replaced by another. The theoretical 
problem then becomes if and how these paradigms can be made reconcilable and able to talk to 
one another? But strictly speaking they cannot within the problematic of ‘paradigms’. 
 
Within the conceptual framework of the arts of reasoning, ‘reason’ become a generic name for this 
dispersed array of intellectual arts – that loose and contingent ensemble and deployment of 
practical acts – which is performative. And here arises the positive side of theoretical 
performativity. It relies for its effectivity on it being performed (and thereby appropriately mastered). 
And this performativity is designed to induce and cultivate a certain scepticism, a pragmatism, a 
self-problematization, even a ‘suspicion’, on the part of the intellect (Thompson 2006). Thus a clear 
distinction between ‘the theorist’ and others would also be undermined by this conceptualization (or 
between expert and lay-person in the language used above): theorists and lay persons are on a 
par with one another, arranged only along a continuum. But this then raises important issues about 
exactly how the ‘mastery of the arts of reasoning’ are opened to both theorists and lay-persons.  
 
And this is not quite a ‘social practice’ either, in the sense of something possessing an inner logic 
seen as the ‘good’ that confirms a certain ‘knowledge community’ (or any other community – in the 
sense of communities being made up of those social practices that ‘typify’ or ‘characterize’ such a 
community). Thus theory in the sense being elaborated here is not a ‘social practice’, nor is it 
reducible to this or directly derivable from it. 
 
But this is ‘performativity’ of a particular kind and operating in a particular manner. It is not simply a 
speech act as such but all those aspects outlined above – the ‘arts of reasoning’ -- comprising that 
loose configurative ensemble of logico-rhetorical methods, cognitive techniques, doctrines, modes 
of proof, techniques and ethical exercises, plus experimental apparatuses, all tied to a specific 
sense and kind of self; that loose assemblage, acquired through the routines of practical mastery, 
often held together by pedagogical anchoring, not be some set of self-contained beliefs. 
 
And this form of theorizing – of necessity – has political aspects and resonances. As pointed out 
above, both the theorist persona and competent lay personhood must display a certain political 
competence as part of their overall epistemic statuses (Turner 2003 explores the nuances and 
consequences of this at length). But a point made above was about situations where such political 
competence of the lay person is missing, and proves almost impossible to construct. Then we 
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would be in a potential downward spiral as far as the recognition of competent expertise is 
concerned. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In conclusion I would like to stress several features of the analysis conducted above. 
 
The first is to suggest that there is nothing necessarily good nor necessarily bad about cross-
disciplinary (C-D) approaches to intellectual activity. There is a perfectly robust defence that can be 
mounted for disciplinarity, the outlines of which were offered in the early part of this paper. As was 
demonstrated in subsequent sections C-D approaches have their definite upsides as well as their 
downsides. One potentially disturbing trend, that could be linked to the effacement of the distinction 
between expert and lay person, is the way opinion and popular prejudice could seriously infect the 
research agenda, something, it was argued, not unconnected to the development of cross-
disciplinarity. In as much as these can be linked to the idea of performativity, there are several 
aspects to this in its relationship to theory, some of which may be having undesirable 
consequences while with other understanding of performativity the effects can be liberating and 
highly positive in respect to C-D. 
 
Probably the best stance to take here is to maintain the tensions between the disciplines. It may 
well be that a slightly agnostic, or even antagonistic, relationship will prove the most productive. 
This really speaks to cultivating a ‘collaborative troubling’ between the disciplines2
 
. 
But in as much as we embrace C-D we may actually be enacting and performing – in part at least – 
the neo-liberal project. But again this need be no bad thing. If we are ‘all neo-liberals now’ 
(Thompson 2008), then there is nothing necessarily wrong with such an activity, difficult though 
that may be to convince a still largely sceptical academic audience!! 
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